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"How did the serpent of inconsistency enter Frege's paradise?"1 
Crispin Wright 
So asks Michael Dummett at the start of chapter 17 of Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics.2 And 
in the final chapter he suggests an answer: that Frege’s major oversight—the key to the collapse 
of the project of Grundgesetze—consisted in  
. . . his supposing there to be a totality containing the extension of every concept defined over it; 
more generally [the mistake] lay in his not having the glimmering of a suspicion of the existence 
of indefinitely extensible concepts.3  
The diagnosis is repeated in the essay, "What is Mathematics About?", where Dummett writes 
that  
Frege's mistake . . . lay in failing to perceive the notion [of a value-range] to be an indefinitely 
extensible one, or, more generally, in failing to allow for indefinitely extensible concepts at all.4 
Now, claims of the form, 
Frege fell into paradox because……. 
1 This article draws on and develops material originally presented at the Fregefest at the University of 
California, Irvine in February 2006 that later provided for my lecture, "Whence the Paradox? Axiom V and 
Indefinite Extensibility", given at the 4th International Lauener Symposium on Analytical Philosophy in 
Bern in May 2010. The Symposium was dedicated to the work of the late Sir Michael Dummett, who 
attended to receive the Lauener Prize for an Outstanding Oeuvre in Analytical Philosophy on the same 
occasion. A transcript of my lecture is published in W. Essler and M. Frauchiger, eds. (2015) 
More recent presentations of the main ideas were at the Dummett symposium in Leeds in 
September 2013, and at the Grundgesetze workshop in New York, the Oslo workshop on Abstraction, and 
the Metaphysical Basis of Logic seminar at the Northern Institute of Philosophy in Aberdeen, all in May of 
2014.  Thanks to the participants on all these occasions for very helpful feedback. Special thanks to Richard 
Heck, Øystein Linnebo and Stewart Shapiro for generous and helpful comments on an earlier draft which 
have saved me from a number of confusions, and especially to Stewart for the shared research that provides 
the platform of the paper, and for countless conversations about the issues over the years. 
2 Dummett (1991) 
3 Dummett (1991), 317 
4 Dummett (1993), p. 441 
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are notoriously difficult to assess even when what replaces the dots is relatively straightforward. 
Paradoxes of any depth are usually complex and seldom involve moves that, once exposed, allow 
of straightforward identification as clear-cut "mistakes". The paradox attending Law V is no 
exception. Diagnostic offerings have included — 
(A) Unrestricted quantification: Frege fell into paradox because he allowed himself to 
quantify over a single, all-inclusive domain of objects (Russell, Dummett). 
 
(B) Impredicative objectual quantification: Frege fell into paradox because he allowed 
himself to define value-ranges using (first order) quantifiers ranging unrestrictedly over 
those very objects (Russell, Dummett). 
 
(C) Impredicative higher-order quantification: Frege fell into paradox because he allowed 
himself to formulate conditions on value-ranges using (higher-order) quantifiers ranging 
over those very conditions  (Russell, Dummett). 
 
(D) Inflation: Frege fell into paradox because he adopted an axiom— Law V—which is 
inflationary, i.e. defines its proper objects by reference to an equivalence on concepts that 
partitions the higher-order domain into too many cells (Boolos, Fine). 
 
And while it is indeed clear that Frege did do all these things, — and prior to that, clear, or 
anyway relatively clear, what it is to do them, — the diagnoses presented are all nevertheless 
problematic. Contra (A), for example, there are multiple instances where unrestricted (objectual) 
quantification seems both intelligible and essential to the expression of the full range of our 
thoughts. Contra (B) and (C), while impredicative quantification of both first and higher-orders is 
indeed essential to the generation of the paradox, it is also essential to a range of foundational 
moves in classical mathematics and, in so far as it may seem objectionable, the objections seem 
more properly epistemological than logical. Contra (D), there is no straightforward connection, in 
a higher-order setting, between unsatisfiability and inconsistency; and it is salient in any case that 
the actual derivation of the contradiction from Frege's axiom nowhere implicitly depends upon an 
assumption of the classical range of the higher-order variables but would go through on, for 
example, a substitutional interpretation of second-order quantification. However with Dummett's 
proposal cited above:  
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(E) Frege fell into paradox because he didn’t have even a glimmering of a suspicion of the 
existence of indefinitely extensible concepts, 
matters may seem yet worse. This diagnosis may seem not to get so far as proposing any definite 
account of Frege’s  “colossal blunder” (as Dummett elsewhere characterises it5) at all, even a 
controversial one. What exactly did Frege do, or fail to do, because he failed to reckon with the 
indefinite extensibility of extension or value-range? What indeed exactly is indefinite 
extensibility? The notion continues to be met with the kind of scepticism which George Boolos 
espoused when he roundly rejected Dummett's diagnosis, opining that it was "To his credit, [that] 
Frege did not have the glimmering of a suspicion of the existence of indefinitely extensible 
concepts."6 [My emphasis.] 
Indefinite extensibility has been connected in recent philosophy of mathematics with 
many large issues, including not just the proper diagnosis of the paradoxes, but the legitimacy of 
unrestricted quantification, the content of quantification (if legitimate at all) over certain kinds of 
large populations, the legitimacy of classical logic for such quantifiers, the proper conception of 
the infinite, and the possibilities for (neo-) logicist foundations for set theory.7 But my project 
here is limited to the appraisal of Dummett's diagnosis.  I shall address a problem that obscures 
the usual intuitive characterisations of the notion of indefinite extensibility, and offer thereby 
what I believe to be the correct characterisation of the notion. En passant, we shall review some 
issues about the "size" of indefinitely extensible concepts. And that will bring us into position to 
scrutinise the connections of the notion as characterised with paradox, and specifically the 
paradox that Russell found for Law V. A full enough plate. 
 
                                                
5 Dummett (1994), p. 243 
6 Boolos (1998), at p. 224. I should observe, though, that, in context, Boolos is assuming that an 
indefinitely extensible concept comes with a prohibition on unrestricted quantification over its instances—
something that Dummett repudiates in his response. 
7 Some of these issues are further pursued in Shapiro and Wright (2006). The first part of my discussion 
here will draw extensively on aspects of that paper. 
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1.  Naïveté or Insouciance? 
I should begin, though, with a short digression and disclaimer. When I speak of “Dummett’s 
diagnosis”, I intend no implication of uniqueness nor to take sides on an issue which, I believe, 
should cause interpreters of Dummett some head-scratching.  As noted above, Dummett has made 
a number of not obviously equivalent observations about the genesis of the paradox. My own 
sense — I will not try to substantiate it here — is that over the years between the publications of 
Frege: Philosophy of Language and Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics he changed his mind 
about unrestricted objectual quantification, at first regarding it as illegitimate but later coming to 
allow that there are legitimate such generalisations but that they must be understood non-
classically (truth-conditionally). But change of mind is not, presumably, at work within the pages 
of Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics. Yet in the chapter whose opening line provides our title, 
there is no mention of indefinite extensibility. Suspicion is cast, rather, on second-order 
quantification, of which Dummett writes that “it is to its presence in Frege’s formal language that 
the contradiction is due”,8 alleging a little later that it was Frege’s “amazing insouciance 
concerning the second order quantifier”9 that was the primary reason for his falling into 
inconsistency. The diagnosis that places the blame on Frege's innocence of the notion of 
indefinite extensibility occurs seven chapters later. These do not seem to be the same diagnosis. 
What is going on? 
 Dummett’s charge of insouciance refers to the extremely and uncharacteristically sketchy 
remarks that Frege offers in Grundgesetze by way of explanation of second order generality.10 
But the main burden of the latter part of ch. 17 of Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics is to explain 
in some detail what goes wrong with Frege’s purported proof of consistency (that every name 
formed in the language of his formal system has a reference) at Grundgesetze §31. What Frege 
                                                
8 Dummett (1991), p. 217 
9 Dummett (1991), p. 218 
10 At Grundgesetze §20 and §25. See Dummett (1991) at pp. 217-8 
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needs to show for the case of second-order quantification is that any sentence (for Frege, name) 
formed by second order quantification into a first-order sentence (name) that has a reference 
likewise has a reference.  As Dummett very clearly explains, the attempt founders on the 
circularity engendered by the fact that the relevant first-order sentences may themselves contain 
occurrences of Frege’s second-order quantifier. But this merely deepens the exegetical puzzle. 
Perhaps Frege’s carelessness in characterising the second-order quantifier contributed to his 
overlooking the shortcomings of the argument of Grundgesetze §31. But how do the 
shortcomings of a purported consistency proof contribute to the explanation of the inconsistency 
of the system it concerns?11 
 The apparent tension is observed by Boolos who archly remarks that “One might wonder 
whether it was Frege’s insouciance or his naïveté that Dummett thinks is to blame for the error.”12 
However Boolos goes on to say that he thinks the Dummett does have a unitary account of the 
source of the contradiction to offer, and then draws attention to two points on Dummett’s behalf. 
The first is that Law V is consistent in a first-order setting.13 The second is that, for any domain of 
sets, D, the Russell paradox shows—“according to Dummett”—that no set containing exactly the 
elements of D that are not self-membered can also be an element of D: the Russellian functor, 
“The set of elements of x that are not members of themselves,” where x is some domain of sets, 
always forces an extension of the domain. But, Boolos observes, the expression of that functor in 
Frege’s formal language will require second-order quantification; thus 
 . . . the introduction of second order quantifiers forces an extension of the domain to comprise such 
new objects . . . Once second-order quantifiers are added, no domain is large enough to contain all 
extensions of concepts defined on that domain. It was because Frege didn't have a glimmering of a 
suspicion of the way each domain must give rise to a properly wider one that he could be insouciant 
about the second-order quantifier."14 
                                                
11 Compare “A failed consistency proof for a consistent system would hardly be a serpent in Eden”, Boolos 
(1998) p. 224 
12 Boolos (1998) p. 220 
13 Something first proved, I believe, by Terence Parsons (1987) 
14 Boolos, op.cit.p. 221 
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Well, other readers may do better, but I find it hard to get any clear sense of what exactly is the 
“unitary” account that Boolos intends these remarks to convey. Russell’s paradox does indeed 
depend on the naïve assumption that the Russellian function on a domain D takes a value within 
D— on ignoring its expansionist tendency, as it were; and the definition of the function does 
indeed require second-order resources. But, notwithstanding the inadequacy of Frege’s 
explanation of the latter and his, perhaps consequential, reliance upon a flawed proof that all was 
safe, the question is: are those resources in good standing or are they not? If they are, they are in 
no way to blame for the paradox. If they are not, the Russellian function is ill-defined and thus 
has no tendency to show that “each domain must give rise to a properly wider one”. 
 It might be suggested that all Dummett need be taken to intend is that Frege’s casual 
handling of second-order quantification in the setup of the system of Grundgesetze resulted in his 
being less than circumspect about the range of resources it provides for the definition of first-
order functions, and that his innocence of the notion of indefinite extensibility will have 
prevented his realising the pressing need for such circumspection. Well, maybe. And Boolos’ 
words will perhaps bear that interpretation. But notice that that is to change the question. It is to 
offer an explanation of why Frege didn't realise that he had left the door open, as it were. But it is 
clear that what Dummett means to be addressing is not that question, but the question why the 
door was open in the first place. We are looking for a diagnosis of the source of the contradiction, 
not of Frege’s oversight of it 
 In his Chairman’s Address15, Dummett responds directly to Boolos’ remarks. A crucial 
passage runs as follows: 
The context principle required the reference of the terms of the theory to be stipulated by laying 
down the values of functions, including concepts, taking their referents as arguments, the whole 
procedure being validated by a proof that a unique reference had been stipulated for every well-
formed expression: Frege’s consistency proof. 
 For Frege, and for anyone who believes his justification for speaking of abstract objects to be 
in part correct, the problem is not so much what made his theory inconsistent as how, in the face of 
the semantics he devised for it, it could have been inconsistent. Boolos remarks that a failed 
                                                
15 Dummett (1994) 
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consistency proof for a consistent system would hardly be a serpent in Eden. This dismissive 
observation would be just if the proof were a mere bright idea appended by Frege to his main 
exposition. It was not: it was integral to his entire conception of the manner in which to justify 
introducing a range of abstract objects. 
 Second-order quantification was essential for the inconsistency . . . 
 
 
I would want to resist the underlying train of thought here. It is perfectly possible to accept that 
reference may be conferred upon a class of abstract singular terms in the kind of way that Frege 
proposed— roughly, by stipulating the content of complex expressions in which they occur in 
such a way that suitable (atomic) such expressions (sentences) have reference (are true)— 
without any liability to paradox, even when second-order resources are freely deployed in the 
stipulations. So much, anyway, is the intended lesson of the modern neo-Fregean constructions of 
arithmetic and analysis. Still, there is an apparent lacuna between the contention, correct or not, 
that Frege's method of introducing abstract singular terms was essentially put in disorder by its 
ungroundedness/circularity and the diagnosis of the paradox that Dummett seems here to be 
suggesting. It is as if, in Dummett’s view, the contradiction is merely a dramatic, occasional 
symptom of this underlying disorder— one that emerges in the environment of (Frege’s casual 
handling of) the second-order quantifier—but the disorder is there anyway, rather as a lip blister 
can emerge, when one has a cold, as a symptom of underlying infection with the herpes virus. 
The reader may find this idea less problematic than I (and Boolos.)  
 The point remains, though, that this train of thought of Dummett’s, whatever insight it 
may prove to contain, seems to have little to do with indefinite extensibility. We are no closer to a 
“unitary account” of Dummett’s thinking on the issue and I shall not here attempt to explore 
further whether such an account is possible. What is unquestionable is that there are intricate and 




2.  Indefinite Extensibility: the problem of characterisation 
The suggestion that indefinite extensibility is playing some kind of devil's part in the paradoxes is 
of course anticipated in Russell, whose [1906] concludes: 
. . . the contradictions result from the fact that . . . there are what we may call self-reproductive 
processes and classes. That is, there are some properties such that, given any class of terms all 
having such a property, we can always define a new term also having the property in question.  
Hence we can never collect all of the terms having the said property into a whole; because, 
whenever we hope we have them all, the collection which we have immediately proceeds to 
generate a new term also having the said property. 
Compare Dummett: an  
indefinitely extensible concept is one such that, if we can form a definite conception of a totality 
all of whose members fall under the concept, we can, by reference to that totality, characterize a 
larger [sic]totality all of whose members fall under it.16 
According to Dummett, an indefinitely extensible concept P has a “principle of extension” that 
takes any definite totality t of objects each of which has P, and produces an object that also has P, 
but is not in t.17 But what does “definite” mean in that? Presumably a concept P is definite for 
Dummett’s purpose in those passages just if it is not indefinitely extensible! If so, then 
Dummett’s remarks won’t do as a definition, even a loose one, since they appeal to its 
complementary “definite” to characterize what it is for a concept to be indefinitely extensible.  
And Russell, of course, does no better by speaking unqualifiedly of “any class of terms all having 
such a property”, since he is taking it for granted that classes, properly so regarded, are “wholes” 
or "have a total"—that is, presumably, are definite in the relevant complementary sense.  
Notice that it would not do just to drop any reference to definiteness, or an equivalent, in 
the intuitive characterisation. If the suggestion had been, for example, that an 
indefinitely extensible concept is one such that, for any given totality all of whose members fall 
under the concept, we can, by reference to that totality, characterize a larger totality all of whose 
members fall under it, 
                                                
16 Dummett (1993), 441 
17 See also Dummett (1991), 316-319, where he cites the above passage from Russell. 
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then the usual suspects would fail the test— if we took set, for instance, as the target concept and 
then picked as the first mentioned "totality" simply the sets themselves, there would be no 
"larger" totality of sets to extend into. And if we then stipulated instead that attention should be 
restricted to proper sub-totalities, then all concepts would, trivially, pass the test.   
This problem of implicit circularity in the intuitive characterization of indefinite 
extensibility is a serious one. Indeed, it is the major difficulty in forming a clear idea of the 
notion. But it would be premature to lose confidence in the notion of indefinite extensibility 
because of it. A reminder may be helpful how the three concepts targeted by the classic set-
theoretic paradoxes — Burali, Cantor, and Russell — do seem to present a suggestive common 
pattern:  
(1) Ordinal. Think of the ordinals in an intuitive way, simply as order-types of well-
orderings. Let O be any definite collection of ordinals.  Let Oʹ be the collection of all 
ordinals smaller than or equal to some member of O. Oʹ is well-ordered under the natural 
ordering of ordinals, so has an order-type — γ. So γ is itself an ordinal.  Let γʹ be the 
order-type of the well-ordering obtained from Oʹ by tacking an element on at the end.  
Then γʹ is an ordinal number, and γʹ is not a member of O.  So ordinal number is 
indefinitely extensible.18  
(2)  Cardinal. Let C be any definite collection of cardinal numbers.  Assign to each of its 
members a set of that exact cardinality, and form the union of these sets, C'.  By Cantor's 
theorem, the collection of subsets of Cʹ is larger than Cʹ, so larger than any cardinal in C.  
So cardinal number is indefinitely extensible. 
(3)  Set/class. Dummett writes  
"Russell's concept class not a member of itself provides a beautiful example of an 
indefinitely extensible concept.  Suppose that we have conceived of a class C all of 
whose members fall under the concept. Then it would certainly involve a contradiction to 
suppose C to be a member of itself. Hence, by considering the totality of the members of 
C together with C itself, we have specified a more inclusive totality than C all of whose 
members fall under the concept class not a member of itself."19 
                                                
18 As Dummett puts it, 
 . . if we have a clear grasp of any totality of ordinals, we thereby have a conception of what is 
intuitively an ordinal number greater than any member of that totality.  Any definite totality of 
ordinals must therefore be so circumscribed as to forswear comprehensiveness, renouncing any 
claim to cover all that we might intuitively recognise as being an ordinal. ((1991) at 316.) 
 
19 Dummett (1993) at p. 441 
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 Observe that it follows that set itself is indefinitely extensible, since any definite 
collection—set—of sets must omit the set of all of its members that do not contain 
themselves. 
 
To be sure, some of the argumentation involved in these cases is potentially contestable. Someone 
could challenge the various set-theoretic principles (Union, Replacement, Power-set, etc.) that are 
implicitly invoked, for instance. But it seems reasonable to agree with Russell and Dummett that 
the examples do exhibit, prima facie, some kind of “self-reproductive” feature. The question is 
whether we can give a more exact, philosophically robust and useful characterisation of it. 
3  Indefinite extensibility and the ordinals: Russell’s Conjecture and ‘small’ cases.   
We can make a start by following up on a suggestion of Russell himself. Russell writes that it “is 
probable” that if P is any concept which demonstrably “does not have an extension”, then “we 
can actually construct a series, ordinally similar to the series of all ordinals, composed entirely of 
terms having the concept P”. The conjecture is in effect that if P is indefinitely extensible, then 
there is a one-to-one function from the ordinals into P.20  
If Russell is right, then any indefinitely extensible concept determines a collection at least 
as populous as the ordinals — so, one might think, surpassing populous! And in that case one 
might worry whether the connection made by Russell’s Conjecture is acceptable.  For Dummett 
himself at least has characteristically taken it that both the natural numbers and real numbers are 
indefinitely extensible totalities in just the same sense that the ordinals and cardinals are, with 
similar consequences, in his opinion, for the understanding of quantification over them and the 
standing of classical logic in the investigation of these domains.  Moreover in the article which 
contains his earliest published discussion of the notion,21 Dummett argues that the proper 
interpretation of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems for arithmetic is precisely to teach that 
arithmetical truth and arithmetical proof are also both indefinitely extensible concepts—yet 
                                                
20 Russell (1906), p. 144 
21 Dummett (1963) 
 11 
neither presumably has an even more than countably infinite extension, still less an ordinals-sized 
one. (The ordinary, finitely based language of second-order arithmetic presumably suffices for the 
expression of any arithmetical truth.)  It would be disconcerting to lose contact with perhaps the 
leading modern proponent of the importance of the notion of indefinite extensibility so early in 
the discussion.  But then who is mistaken, Russell in 190622 or Dummett? Can there be "small" 
indefinitely extensible  concepts?  
 The issue will turn out to be important for the proper understanding of indefinite 
extensibility.  To fix ideas, consider the so-called Berry paradox, the paradox of “the smallest 
natural number not denoted by any expression of English of fewer than 17 words”.  Here is a 
statement of it. Define an expression t to be numerically determinate if t denotes a natural number 
and let C be the set—assuming there is one—of all numerically determinate expressions of 
English.  Consider the expression: “The smallest natural number not denoted by any expression in 
C of fewer than 17 words.” Assume that this is a numerically determinate expression of English.  
Then contradiction follows from that assumption, the assumption that the set C exists, and the 
empirical datum that b has 16 words (counting the contained occurrence of ‘C’ as one word). 
 The analogy with the classic paradoxes may look good: a principle of extension 
seemingly inbuilt into a concept leads to aporia when applied to a totality supposedly embracing 
all instances of the concept. But, as emerges if we think the process of “indefinite extension” 
through, there are complications.  
 To see why, let an initial collection, D, consist of just the ten English numerals, “zero” to 
                                                
22 It is relevant to recall that Russell (1908) himself, in motivating a uniform diagnosis of the paradoxes, 
included in his list of chosen examples some at least where the “self-reproductive” process seems bounded 
by a relatively small cardinal.  For instance the Richard paradox concerning the class of decimals that can 
be defined by means of a finite number of words makes play with a totality which, if indeed indefinitely 
extensible, is at least no greater than the class of decimals itself, i.e. than 20א.  Was Russell simply unaware 
of this type of example in 1906, when he proposed the conjecture discussed above?  Or did he not in 1906 
regard the Richard paradox and others involving “small” totalities as genuine examples of the same genre, 
then revising that opinion two years later? 
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“nine”. Count 'D', so defined, as part of English, and consider “the smallest natural number not 
denoted by any member of D of fewer than 17 words”.  Call this 16-worded expression “W1”. Its 
denotation, clearly, is 10. W1 is a numerically determinate expression of English, but not in D.  
Let D1 be D∪{W1}.  Count ' D1' as an English one-word name.  Now repeat the construction on 
D1, producing W2.  Let D2 be D1∪{W2}. Count ' D2' as an English one-word name.  Do the 
construction again.  Keep going . . .  
 How far can you keep going? Well, not into the transfinite. For reflect that 0 to 9 are all 
denoted by single-word members of D; 10 is denoted by the 16-worded “the smallest natural 
number not denoted by any member of D of fewer than 17 words”; 11 is denoted by the 16-worded 
“the smallest natural number not denoted by any member of D1 of fewer than 17 words”; 12 is 
denoted by the 16-worded “the smallest natural number not denoted by any member of D2 of fewer 
than 17 words”; and so on.  So every natural number is denoted by some expression of English of 
fewer than 17 words. So the “the smallest natural number not denoted by any expression in C of 
fewer than 17 words” has no reference—and hence is not a numerically determinate expression 
after all, contrary to the assumptions of the paradox.  
 This result does not immediately give us the last word on the Berry paradox, since it 
depends on assumptions about English — specifically, that it may be reckoned to contain all the 
series of names, D, D1, D2, etc., and that these can be reckoned to be one-word names — which 
may be rejected.23 The point I am making, rather, is that, when the relevant assumptions about 
what counts as English are allowed, the construction shows that while there is indeed a kind of 
                                                
23 What if we do not make those assumptions? Well, even so, the point stands in general that for any 
condition, C, on numerically determinate expressions, the template: 
 The least natural number not denoted by any C-expression of less than such-and-such a degree of 
 complexity, 
cannot always generate an expression which (i) is numerically determinate, (ii) is itself of less than such-
and such a degree of complexity and (iii) satisfies C. In the worked example, C—English—was 
characterised in such a way that (i) proved to fail. If the paradox-monger so characterises C as to deny the 
resources for that upshot, we can expect that his enterprise will be frustrated by failure of (ii) and/or (iii) 
instead. 
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indefinite extensibility about the concept, numerically determinate expression of English, it is—if I 
may be allowed the oxymoron—a bounded indefinite extensibility: indefinite extensibility up to a 
limit; in this case the first transfinite ordinal, ω.  When the limit is reached, the result of the 
construction is a (presumably) definite collection of entities that does not in turn admit of 
extension by the original operation.  So the targeted concept will not be indefinitely extensible, at 
least not in the spirit of Dummett's and Russell's intuitive characterisations. 
 Consider another example. As noted above, Dummett [1963] contends that Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorem shows that arithmetical truth is indefinitely extensible.  It may seem clear 
enough what he has in mind. It is straightforward to initiate something that looks like a process of 
“indefinite extension”.  Just let A0 be the theorems of some standard axiomatisation of arithmetic.  
For each natural number n, let An+1 be the collection An together with a Gödel sentence for An.  
Presumably, if An is Definite, then so is An+1, and, of course, An and An+1 are distinct.  Unlike the 
case of the Berry paradox, we know that this construction can indeed be continued into the 
transfinite.  Let Aω be the union of A0, A1, . . .  Arguably, Aω too is definite.  Indeed, if A0 is 
recursively enumerable, then so is Aω. Thus, we can obtain Aω+1, Aω+2, . . .  and so on. Then we 
may take the union of those to get A2ω, and onward, "Gödelising" all the way.
24 
 On the usual, classical construal of the extent of the ordinals, however, this process too 
cannot continue without limit, but must “run out” well before the first uncountable ordinal. Let λ 
be an ordinal and let us assume that we have obtained Aλ.  The foregoing construction will take us 
on to the next set Aλ+1 only if the collection Aλ has a Gödel sentence.  And that will be so only if 
                                                
24 I don't think it matters for the purposes of the example but I am aware that I am slurring over some 
complicated mathematical issues here concerning how exactly, where λ is a limit ordinal, one is to arrive at 
a recursively characterised, so "Gödelisable", specification of Aλ . 
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Aλ is recursively axiomatisable.  But clearly it cannot be the case that for every (countable) ordinal 
λ, Aλ is recursively axiomatisable.  For there are uncountably many countable ordinals but only 
countably many recursive functions. 
4  Indefinite extensibility explicated. 
Let’s take stock. Russell’s Conjecture, that indefinitely extensible concepts are marked by the 
possession of extensions into which the classical ordinals are injectible, still stands.  At any rate 
some apparent exceptions to it, like numerically determinate expression of English (when 
"English" is understood to have the expressive resources deployed above) and arithmetical truth, 
are not really exceptions. For the principles of extension they involve are not truly indefinitely 
extensible but stabilise after some series of iterations isomorphic to a proper initial segment of the 
ordinals25—at least if the ordinals are allowed their full classical extent. 
 That said, though, the point remains that Russell’s Conjecture, even should it be 
extensionally correct, is certainly not the kind of characterisation of indefinite extensibility we 
should like to have.  If Russell’s Conjecture were the best we could do, it would be a triviality 
that the ordinals themselves are indefinitely extensible.  What is wanted is a perspective from 
which we can explain why Russell’s Conjecture is good, if indeed it is—equivalently, a 
perspective from which we can characterise exactly what it is about ordinal that makes it the 
paradigm of an indefinitely extensible concept. 
 So let's step back. An indefinitely extensible totality P is intuitively unstable, “restless”, 
or “in growth”.  Whenever you think you have it safely corralled in some well-fenced enclosure, 
suddenly—hey presto!—another fully P-qualified instance pops up outside the fence.  The 
primary problem in clarifying this kind of figure is to dispense with the metaphors of the style of 
                                                
25 That's the correct thing to say about the Berry case as constructed. For the arithmetical truth and 
"Gödelisation" example, the scope for iterated application of the principle of extension peters out before a 
certain ordinal number of repetitions is reached but has no specific ordinal lowest bound. 
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“well-fenced enclosure” and “growth”. Obviously a claim is intended about sub-totalities of P 
and functions on them to (new) members of P. But, as we observed, the intended claim does not 
concern all sub-totalities of P: we need to say for which kind of sub-totalities of P the claim of 
extensibility within P is being made. If we could take it for granted that the notion of indefinite 
extensibility is independently clear and in good standing and picks out a distinctive type of 
totality, then we could characterize the relevant kind of sub-totality exactly as Dummett did—
they are the sub-totalities that are, by contrast, definite.  For the indefinite extensibility of a 
totality, if it consists in anything, precisely consists in the fact that any definite sub-totality of it is 
merely a proper sub-totality.  But at this point the clarity and good standing of the notion of 
infinite extensibility may not yet be taken for granted. 
 Here is the promised way forward.  Let us, at least temporarily, finesse the “which sub-
totalities?” issue by starting with an explicitly relativised notion.  Let P be a concept of items of a 
certain type τ.  Typically, τ will be the (or a) type of individual objects.  Let Π be a higher-order 
concept— a concept of concepts of type τ items.  Let us say that P is indefinitely extensible with 
respect to Π if and only if there is a function F from items of the same type as P to items of type τ 
such that if Q is any sub-concept of P such that ΠQ then 
 (1) FQ falls under the concept P, 
 (2) It is not that case that FQ falls under the concept Q, and 
(3) ΠQ', where Q' is the concept instantiated just by FQ and by every item which 
instantiates Q  (i.e., ∀x(Q'x  ≡ (Qx ∨ x = FQ)); (in set-theoretic terms, then, Qʹ is 
(Q∪{FQ}). 
 
Intuitively, the idea is that the sub-concepts of P of which Π holds have no maximal member. For 
any sub-concept Q of P such that ΠQ, there is a proper extension Q' of Q such that ΠQ'. 
  This relativised notion of indefinite extensibility is quite promiscuous, covering a lot of 
different examples. Here are three: 
(Natural number):  Px iff x is a natural number ; ΠQ iff the Qs (i.e the instances of Q) are 
finite in number; FQ is the successor of the largest instance of Q.   
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 Thus natural number is indefinitely extensible with respect to finite. 
 
(Real number):  Px iff x is a real number; ΠQ iff the Qs are countably infinite.  Define 
FQ using a Cantorian diagonal construction.   
 Thus real number is indefinitely extensible with respect to countable. 
 
(Arithmetical truth):  Px iff x is a truth of arithmetic; ΠQ iff the Qs are recursively 
enumerable.  FQ is a Gödel sentence generated by the Qs.   
 Since FQ is a truth of arithmetic and is not one of the Qs, arithmetical truth is 
indefinitely extensible with respect to recursively enumerable. 
 
And naturally the three principal suspects are covered as well: 
 
(Ordinal number):  Px iff x is an ordinal ; ΠQ iff the Qs exemplify a well-ordering type, γ 
(which since Q is a sub-concept of ordinal, they will.)  FQ is the successor of γ.   
 Thus ordinal number is indefinitely extensible with respect to the property of 
exemplifying a well-ordering type 
 
(Cardinal number):  Px iff x is a cardinal number; ΠQ iff the Qs compose a set. FQ is the 
power set of the union of a totality containing exactly one exemplar set of each Q 
cardinal.  
 Thus cardinal number is indefinitely extensible with respect to the property of 
composing a set. 
 
(Set):  Px iff x is a set; ΠQ iff the Qs compose a set.  FQ is the set of Qs that are not self-
members.  
 Thus set is indefinitely extensible with respect to the property of composing a set. 
 
 
This relativised notion of indefinite extensibility should impress as straightforward enough, but it 
does not, of course, shed any immediate philosophical light on the paradoxes. Our goal remains to 
define a notion that may shed such light, an unrelativised notion of indefinite extensibility that 
still covers ordinal number, cardinal number, and set but somehow illuminates why they are 
associated with paradox while natural number, real number and arithmetical truth are not. So 
what next? 
 Three further steps are needed.  Notice to begin with that the listed examples sub-divide 
into three kinds. There are those where—helping ourselves to the classical ordinals—we can say 
that some ordinal λ places a lowest limit on the length of the series of Π-preserving applications 
of F to any Q such that ΠQ.  Intuitively, while each series of extensions whose length is less than 
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λ results in a collection of P’s which is still Π, once the series of iterations extends as far as λ, the 
resulting collection of P’s is no longer Π, and so the “process” stabilises. This was the situation 
noted with numerically determinate expression of English under the assumptions of our 
discussion of the Berry paradox, and is also the situation of the first example above.  Then there 
are cases where, whist we may not be able to nominate any particular classical ordinal as a lowest 
limit on the length of the series of Π-preserving applications of F to any Q such that ΠQ, we can 
at least identify specific ordinal limits. That is, arguably, the case for the second two listed 
examples. But neither of these is the situation with the principal suspects: in those cases there is 
no classical ordinal limit to the Π-preserving iterations. With ordinal number, this is obvious, 
since the higher-order property Π in that case just is the property of having a well-ordering type.  
Indeed, let λ be any ordinal.  Then the first λ ordinals have the order type λ and so they have the 
property.  The “process” thus does not terminate or stabilise at λ.  With set and cardinal number, 
we get the same result if we assume that for each ordinal λ, any totality that has order type λ is a 
set and (thus) has a cardinality. 
 Let’s accordingly refine the relativised notion to mark this distinction.  So first, for any 
ordinal λ say that P is no-more-than-λ-extensible with respect to Π just in case P and Π meet the 
conditions for the relativised notion as originally defined but λ places a limit on the length of the 
series of Π-preserving applications of F to any sub-concept Q of P such that ΠQ. Next, say that P 
is properly indefinitely extensible with respect to Π just if P meets the conditions for the 
relativised notion as originally defined and there is no λ such that P is no-more-than-λ-extensible 
with respect to Π.  Finally, say that P is indefinitely extensible (simpliciter) just in case there is a 
Π such that P is properly indefinitely extensible with respect to Π. 
 My suggestion, then, is that the circularity involved in the apparent need to characterize 
indefinite extensibility by reference to definite sub-concepts/collections of a target concept P can 
 18 
be finessed by appealing instead at the same point to the existence of some species—Π—of sub-
concepts of P/collections of Ps for which Π-hood is limitlessly preserved under iteration of the 
relevant operation.   
 This notion still contains, N.B., a relativity. Indefinite extensibility, so characterised, is 
relative to one’s conception of what constitutes a limitless series of iterations of a given operation.  
No doubt we start out innocent of any conception of serial limitlessness save the one implicit in 
one’s first idea of the infinite, whereby any countable potential infinity is limitless.  Under the 
aegis of this conception, natural number is properly indefinitely extensible with respect to finite 
and so, just as Dummett suggests, indefinitely extensible simpliciter. The crucial conceptual 
innovation which transcends this initial conception of limitlessness and takes us to the ordinals as 
classically conceived is to add to the idea that every ordinal has a successor the principle that 
every infinite series of ordinals has a limit‚ a first ordinal lying beyond all its elements—the 
resource encapsulated in Cantor’s Second Number Principle.  If it is granted that this idea is at 
least partially—as it were, initial-segmentally—acceptable, the indefinite extensibility of natural 
number will be an immediate casualty of it. (Critics of Dummett who have not been able to see 
what he is driving at are presumably merely taking for granted the orthodoxy that the second 
number principle is at least partially acceptable.) 
 
5  Indefinite extensibility: Burali-Forti  
Very well. Roughly summarized, then, the proposal is that P is indefinitely extensible just in case, 
for some Π, any Π sub-concept of P allows of a limitless series of Π-preserving enlargements. 
Since the series of Π-preserving enlargements is limitless, any such concept P must indeed allow 
of an injection of the ordinals into its instances, so Russell' s conjecture is confirmed by this 
account. It is immediately striking, though, that there seems to be nothing automatically 
paradoxical about indefinite extensibility, so characterised. Why should a concept in good 
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standing not be sufficiently "expansive" to contain a limitlessly expanding series of Π sub-
concepts without ever puncturing, as it were? I'll return to this below. 
 Still, there is a connection with paradox nearby. For example, in case P is ordinal, and 
ΠQ holds just if the Q’s exemplify a well-order-type, it seems irresistible to say that ordinal is 
itself Π.  After all, the ordinals are well-ordered.  But then the relevant principle of extension, F, 
kicks in and dumps a new object on us that both must and cannot be an ordinal—must because it 
corresponds, it seems, to a determinate order-type; but cannot because the principle of extension 
always generates a non-instance of the concept to which it is applied.  Thus runs the Burali-Forti 
paradox. 
 The question, therefore, is why we have allowed our intuitive concept of ordinal to fall, 
fatally, within the compass of the relevant Π/F pair?  For that, it may seem, is the key faux pas. 
 Well, but what option did we have? There is no room for question whether the ordinals 
are well ordered. But to be well-ordered is to have an order-type, and we have identified the 
ordinal numbers with order-types. The only move open, it seems, is to deny that every well-
ordered series is of a determinate order-type, has an ordinal number, Specifically, it seems we 
have to deny that ordinal itself determines a well-ordered series of a determinate order type and 
so has an ordinal number. But we need—as too few theorists of these matters have been wont to 
do—to take the measure of the price of that denial. The price is that before we can assure 
ourselves of the existence of any particular limit ordinal, we need first to know that its putative 
predecessors are not 'all the ordinals there are'. And this price will be exacted right back at first 
base, when the issue is that of justifying the existence of ω, the limit of the finite ordinals. In 
short, the pressure that induces the faux pas is just the pressure to allow the ordinals to run into 
the Cantorian transfinite in a principled fashion in the first place. The Burali-Forti paradox, and 
the more general predicament of ordinal number that it brings out, thus seems aptly described as 
indeed exactly a paradox of indefinite extensibility.  
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 Say that P is reflexively indefinitely extensible just in case P is indefinitely extensible as 
characterised above and, in addition, ΠP—i.e. P itself satisfies, or anyway intuitively ought to 
satisfy, the trigger concept Π. Reflexive indefinite extensibility is the notion that has the intrinsic 
connection with paradox that we have been looking for. Any reflexively indefinitely extensible 
concept will generate a paradox of the broad structure of the Burali-Forti paradox. Ordinal, as 
intuitively, innocently understood, is reflexively indefinitely extensible. 
 
6  Indefinite extensibility: Cantor 
How close is the comparison provided by cardinal number and Cantor's paradox? These remarks 
of Dummett suggest that he regards the situation as a tight parallel: 
. . . to someone who has long been used to finite cardinals, and only to [finite cardinals], it seems 
obvious that there can only be finite cardinals.  A cardinal number, for him, is arrived at by 
counting; and the very definition of an infinite totality is that it is impossible to count it.  . . . [But 
this] prejudice is one that can be overcome:  the beginner can be persuaded that it makes sense, 
after all, to speak of the number of natural numbers.  Once his initial prejudice has been overcome, 
the next stage is to convince the beginner that there are distinct [infinite] cardinal numbers:  not all 
infinite totalities have as many members as each other.  When he has become accustomed to this 
idea, he is extremely likely to ask, ‘How many transfinite cardinals are there?’. How should he be 
answered?  He is very likely to be answered by being told, ‘You must not ask that question’.  But 
why should he not?  If it was, after all, all right to ask, ‘How many numbers are there?’, in the 
sense in which ‘number’ meant ‘finite cardinal’, how can it be wrong to ask the same question 
when ‘number’ means ‘finite or transfinite cardinal’?  A mere prohibition leaves the matter a 
mystery.  It gives no help to say that there are some totalities so large that no number can be 
assigned to them.  We can gain some grasp on the idea of a totality too big to be counted . . . but 
once we have accepted that totalities too big to be counted may yet have numbers, the idea of one 
too big even to have a number conveys nothing at all.  And merely to say, ‘If you persist in talking 
about the number of all cardinal numbers, you will run into contradiction’, is to wield the big 
stick, but not to offer an explanation.26 
 
However, I think the parallel is questionable. It is true that we only get the indefinitely extensible 
series of transfinite cardinals up and running in the first place by first insisting on one-one 
correspondence between concepts as necessary and sufficient for sameness, and hence existence, 
of cardinal numbers in general—not just in the finite case— and that the conception of cardinal 
number as embracing both the finite and the spectacular array of transfinite cases thus only arises 
in the first place when it is taken without question that concepts in general—or at least sortal 
                                                
26 Dummett (1991), pp. 315-316 
 21 
concepts in general: concepts that can sustain determinate relations of one-one correspondence—
have cardinal numbers, identified and distinguished in the light of those relations.  That is how 
the intuitive barrier to the question, how many natural numbers are there, is overcome.  And it is 
also true that that at least loosens the lid on Pandora’s box:  for the intuitive barrier to the 
question, how many cardinal numbers are there is thereby overcome too.  But loosening the lid 
isn't enough to trigger paradox. Hume's principle, identifying the cardinal numbers associated 
with sortal concepts in general just when those concepts are bijectable, encapsulates exactly the 
"resistance-overcoming" move that Dummett is taking about. And it generates, indeed, not 
merely a cardinal number of cardinal numbers but the universal number "Anti-zero", the number 
of absolutely everything that there is. But it does not spawn any paradox, as far as it goes. It is a 
consistent principle; at least, it is consistent in classical second-order logic. To get the paradox — 
Cantor's paradox — out of the notion of cardinal number that Hume's principle characterises, we 
need to embed it in a set-theory containing the associated principles sufficient to generate 
Cantor's theorem itself: unrestricted Union, an exemplar set for any given set of cardinals, and a 
set of all cardinals. None of that baggage is entailed just by the assumption that every sortal 
concept has a cardinal number, identified and distinguished from others by relations of one-one 
correspondence. 
 Moreover, the notion of cardinal number is not needed at all to spring that paradox. 
Given only a universal set, and unrestricted power set, standard moves in naive set-theory will 
allow us to prove both that its power set is injectable into the universal set (since the former is a 
proper subset of the latter) and that the there can be no such injection (via the diagonalisation in 
Cantor's theorem.) This is already a paradox. But it is a paradox for the (naïve) notion of set. 
Cardinal number, as extended into the transfinite via a criterion of one-one correspondence, is not 
in play. Someone could reject that extension and still have to confront the antinomy. The core of 
Cantor's paradox can indeed be assumed under our template for a paradox of indefinite 
extensibility: simply take P as object (or self-identical), ΠQ as the Qs compose a set and F as the 
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power-set operation. Consider any such Π concept, Q. The reasoning of Cantor's theorem shows 
that some of the members of FQ cannot be instances of Q. This immediately gives a contradiction 
when P itself is taken to be Π, i.e. when we assume a universal set. But no assumptions about 
cardinal number are involved. It is true that, as illustrated earlier, cardinal number is indefinitely 
extensible with respect to set when the appropriate assumptions about sets —union, power and 
replacement — are made, and that this is enough for a paradox of indefinite extensibility if 
cardinal number is itself assumed to determine a set. But this should impress as a frame-up, 
rather than an insight. The real problem is with the set-theoretic assumptions involved. 
 Notice, incidentally, that if we deny that set, and cardinal number themselves determine 
sets, then we obtain — or at least I know of no reason to doubt that we obtain — examples of the 
possibility shortly canvassed earlier: concepts that are indefinitely extensible but with whose 
indefinite extensibility no paradox is (so far as one can see) associated. The philosophical 
justifiability of that denial is, naturally, entirely another matter. 
7. Basic Law V 
If the foregoing is correct, the cases of two of the 'principal suspects', ordinal number and 
cardinal number, are different. The former is unquestionably guilty as charged: ordinal number, 
as intuitively understood, is essentially reflexively indefinitely extensible and thereby paradox 
generating; but the jury should find the charge against cardinal number unproven. When 
comprehension principles are accepted for the ordinals that both ensure that every well-ordered 
collection has an ordinal and provide for unlimited applicability of successor and limit, ordinal 
number is essentially susceptible to a paradox of indefinite extensibility qua satisfying the 
relevant trigger concept, Π. But when comprehension for the cardinals is determined by Hume's 
Principle, it takes set-theoretic assumptions to make a case that cardinal number is indefinitely 
extensible, and further set-theoretic assumptions to make a paradox out of that. These 
assumptions have no evident intrinsic connection with cardinal number.  
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 So what, finally, about value-range as it features in Law V?  Is it appropriate — 
insightful— in the light of the account of indefinite extensibility now on the table, and the 
connection of its reflexive variant with paradox, to attribute the antinomy that Russell discovered 
to the indefinite extensibility of the notion that Law V characterises? 
 Well, there are some subtleties here, and a major unresolved issue. Let's start by noting 
that there is certainly a paradox of indefinite extensibility in the offing. Here is how it goes. 
Restrict attention to the case of value -ranges whose domains are concepts and values truth-
values—i.e. to the case of extensions of concepts— so that we have in effect this special case of 
the axiom: 
(∀P)(∀Q)({x:Px}={x:Qx} ↔ (∀x)(Px ↔ Qx))27 
Extensionality and Naïve Comprehension can be read off straight away: extensions are identical 
just when their associated concepts are co-extensive; and every concept has one. (Proof: take ‘P’ 
for ‘Q’, detach the left-hand-side of the biconditional, and existentially generalise on one 
occurrence of ‘{x:Px}’.) So absolutely any concept of extensions is associated with its own 
extension. Take P then as extension itself, and Π as has an extension. Let Q be any subconcept of 
P. By Law V, Q has an extension.  Define membership in one of the natural ways.28 Consider the 
concept: Qx and not xεx.  Call this concept Q*. Form its extension, q*. Choose this for FQ. 
Suppose Qq*. Do we have q*εq*? If so then, q* falls under Q* and is thereby a Q that is not a 
member of itself. But, by the definition of q*,  Qq* and not q*εq* is in turn sufficient for q* to be 
a member of itself. Contradiction. So not Qq* . Take Q' as the concept: Qx V x=q* . . . 
                                                
27 — frequently, though strictly incorrectly, represented as Law V in contemporary discussion. 
 
28  For instance, stipulate that x is a member of y just if x satisfies every P of which y is the extension; or 
that x is a member of y just if x satisfies some P of which y is the extension. (Note that the former, though 
not the latter, will have the effect that x will be a member of y if y is not an extension; but they will coincide 
if we restrict our ontology to the items characterised by Law V as—after the stipulation he introduces in 
Grundgesetze §10 to address the analogue of the Caesar problem for the True and the False—Frege in 
effect does.) 
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 Referring back to the three conditions listed in section 3 for our initial, relativised notion 
of indefinite extensibility, the foregoing completes a case for saying that extension is indefinitely 
extensible with respect to has an extension. Paradox is then immediate when we reflect that by a 
special case of Law V, we should intuitively have that ΠP, i.e. that extension itself has an 
extension, and so is reflexively indefinitely extensible with respect to has an extension. (Compare: 
that there is a set of all sets.) 
 Since Law V provides us with a singular-term forming operator on concept-expressions 
whose sense is effectively that of  "The extension of . . ", we can run the foregoing paradox in 
Grundgesetze if we take the concept of an extension to be captured by: for some F, x = the 
extension of F. But although it smells pretty similar, this is not quite the paradox that Russell 
discovered. Paradoxes of indefinite extensibility, as now understood, turn essentially on reflexive 
indefinite extensibility: on the application of the principle of extension, F, to the indefinitely 
extensible concept P itself— an application made possible by P's satisfaction of the higher-order 
trigger concept, Π. The paradox just adumbrated has exactly that shape, but the indefinite 
extensibility of extension (value-range) doesn’t feature in the reasoning from Law V that Russell 
found — or at least, that Frege took him to have found.  The key resource for that reasoning is 
simply the license, granted by Law V, to take it that every monadic open sentence expressible in 
Grundgesteze that has an objectual argument place has an extension, and hence in particular that x 
is not self-membered has an extension. The assumption that extension has an extension is not at 
work in the Russellian brew.  
 A reminder may be helpful of how the brewing goes. Derive naïve abstraction for 
extensions  (∀P)(∃y)(y = {x:Px}) 
from Law V in the manner adumbrated above and then instantiate P to (this version, e.g, of) the 
concept of non-self-membership: 
    (∃Q)(z ={x:Qx} & ~Qz),  
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Apply naïve abstraction to that to obtain Russell's rogue extension: 
   {z: (∃Q)(z ={x:Qx} & ~Qz)} 
and call this object r. Suppose now that r satisfies the condition on its own members, i.e., is a 
member of itself:  
   (∃Q)(r ={x:Qx}  & ~Qr) 
Let P be a witness of this existential. Since, by Law V, any concept of which r is the extension is 
co-extensive with P, it follows that non-self-membership as defined above is co-extensive with 
P,29 and hence, since ~Pr, that   
   ~(∃Q)(r ={x:Qx} & ~Qr), 
i.e. that r fails to satisfy the condition on its own members. (That's the step at which, egregiously 
impredicatively, we assume the Russellian condition to lie within the range of its own existential 
quantifier.) It follows (classically) that r falls under every concept Q of which it is the extension, 
and hence that it satisfies the condition on its own members after all . . .  
 Again: this reasoning does not fit the template for a paradox of indefinite extensibility for 
extension. In the presence of Law V in full generality, extension is indeed, intuitively, reflexively 
indefinitely extensible, but the paradox to which Russell drew Frege's attention is not the paradox 
associated with that point.  
 Still, as some readers may be impatient to observe,30 it is possible to present Russell's 
paradox as a paradox of indefinite extensibility by exactly the standards of our template for such 
paradoxes. Only the concept whose reflexive indefinite extensibility it exploits is not that of 
extension as such but rather: falls under no concept of which it is the extension. Take this concept 
                                                
29 As the reader will appreciate, it is at this point that the attempt to derive a corresponding contradiction 
from Hume's Principle is thwarted. 
 
30 Thanks to Toby Meadows here. 
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for P and take Π as has an extension. And let F(Q) simply be the extension of the concept, Q. 
Now Law V gives that ΠP. And Russell's paradox, now explicitly wearing the face of a paradox 
of indefinite extensibility, ensues. 
 Here is the detail. We need to show that, in the presence of Law V, these selections for P, 
Π, and F deliver each of the conditions proposed in section 3 above for P to be indefinitely 
extensible with respect to Π, viz. that for our chosen function F 
 (1) FQ falls under the concept P, 
 (2) It is not that case that FQ falls under the concept Q, and 
(3) ΠQ', where Q' is the concept instantiated just by FQ and by every item which 
instantiates Q   
 
(3) is immediate from Law V. For (2), suppose for reductio that Q(FQ).  Then, since Q is any 
sub-concept of P, we have P(FQ). So by our choice for P, FQ falls under no concept of which it 
is the extension. So (2) FQ doesn’t fall under Q. So that is one concept of which FQ is the 
extension but under which it does not fall. It follows by Law V that it fails to fall under any 
concept of which it is the extension, and hence (1) that P(FQ).    
 Alright. So should we now accept that the Dummettian diagnosis of the serpent's ingress 
with which we started is correct?  
 Well, it is doubtless true that Frege had "no glimmering of a suspicion" of the notion of 
(reflexive) indefinite extensibility, and has consequently overlooked that his Law V, in 
conjunction with the proof theory and definitional (open-sentence forming) resources of the 
underlying logic of Grundgesetze, allows us to introduce (the extensions of) a whole range of 
reflexively indefinitely extensible concepts and provides deductive resources sufficient for the 
derivation of the associated paradoxes. However, I think Dummett's account should impress as, 
so far, a much more tendentious explanation of the roots of the paradoxes in Grundgesetze than 
the corresponding diagnosis in the case of ordinal and Burali-Forti. 
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  The Burali-Forti paradox flows directly from comprehension principles that go right to 
the heart of the intended notion of ordinal number.  With cardinal number, by contrast, or so I 
argued, there is no such direct connection: a paradox of indefinite extensibility can indeed be 
manufactured for the notion, but the apparatus required to do that involves significant set-
theoretic postulates (including in particular the assumption that the cardinals compose a set) that 
have no intrinsic connection with the idea of cardinal number per se.  And the case of the 
paradoxes associated with Law V is arguably closer to the latter situation. To stress: the 
paradoxes in Grundgesetze arise from a co-operation between the principle of objectual 
comprehension encoded in Law V and the impredicative principles of conceptual, or functional, 
comprehension that are inexplicit in Frege's own presentation but crucial to the intended 
functioning of his system. Law V encodes the most straightforward possible view—absolutely 
integral to Frege's philosophy of mathematics and his treatment of mathematical existence —of 
the relation between concepts and their associated logical objects. But the propensity of this 
straightforward view to issue in indefinitely extensible populations of mathematical objects 
entirely depends upon the collateral repertoire of concepts that Frege seemingly unhesitatingly 
plunged into—a repertoire that incorporated unconstrained use of formulas involving 
quantification over all concepts, and allowed any such formulas with free objectual argument 
places in turn to determine concepts falling within their own range of quantification. When, by 
contrast, Law V is taken in conjunction with predicative systems of higher-order logic, no 
indefinitely extensible concepts of the objects it concerns can be formulated and the resulting 
systems are consistent.31    
 So we have a competitor to Dummett's diagnosis, viz. that Frege fell into paradox 
because he failed to think through the implications, in the presence of Law V, of the full 
                                                
31 A result due to Heck (1996). For a valuable overview of potency and consistency issues for predicative 
second-order theories based on Law V, see Burgess (2005) ch. 2. 
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repertoire of open sentences on which the higher-order quantifiers in Grundgesetze are permitted 
to generalise— failed, if you like, to reckon with the expressive resources, and especially those of 
diagonalisation, that come with classical, impredicative higher-order logic. He simply "didn't 
think of that kind of case".  
 Which is the better account? Well, someone who sides with Frege in taking it that 
classical impredicative higher-order logic is nonetheless the correct higher-order logic will have 
no option but to assimilate Russell's paradox to Burali-Forti's: each will be correctly viewed as a 
paradox of indefinite extensibility, properly so described, flowing directly from comprehension 
principles that are integral to the species of objects concerned. There will then be no alternative 
but to conclude that the simple correlation between concepts (more generally, functions) and 
objects postulated by Law V encapsulates a conception of mathematical ontology that was not 
merely absolutely integral to Frege's own logicism— a conception whereby the mathematical 
objects of arithmetic and analysis are simply the logical objects that are the Fregean surrogates of 
functions—but also incoherent at its core. And this of course was Frege's own reaction. So 
conceived, the paradox does indeed go right to the heart of his vision of the subject matter of 
mathematics. That is why his reaction to it was eventually one of despair. 
 But there is the alternative: to question whether the kind of generality that is the 
legitimate focus of higher-order logic is correctly implemented by the unrestrictedly 
impredicative system that Frege invented. It is familiar that reservations about this tend to be 
inaudible to one who thinks of the range of the higher-order quantifiers as a fixed comprehensive 
universe, either of sets or of set-like entities, and that they tend to seem urgent to one who thinks 
rather of such quantification as essentially answerable to the satisfaction-conditions of 
formulable, intelligible open-sentences. The division corresponds roughly to that between those 
who sympathise with Quine's famous jibe about higher-order logic, that it is essentially set-theory 
in "sheep's clothing" and have no time for the predicativist restrictions on set-theory itself that 
would pre-empt its mathematically more exotic reaches, and those who recognise that higher-
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order logic's claim to be logic rests squarely on its capacity to constrain the scope of its 
quantifiers to generalisation over predications, atomic and complex, that can in principle feature 
in the thought and inferential practices of a rational agent.32 
 I know of no basis for attributing the latter type of view to Frege. But there is a case for 
thinking that any serious logicism must work with a conception of higher-order logic of this broad 
stripe if a successful execution of the technical part of its programme is to carry the 
epistemological significance that is traditionally intended. It is therefore an awkward fact, from 
the point of view of a sympathiser with Frege's project, that, syntactically viewed, the lowest 
order of impredicative comprehension sufficient for the paradoxes is also needed for the 
derivation from Law V of Peano arithmetic and real analysis.33 Had Frege anticipated and 
endorsed predicativism in his philosophy of logic, the formal project of Grundgesetze would thus 
have been curtailed in any case. And while there are forms of impredicative comprehension that 
can be consistently adjoined to Law V in company with the standard proof theory of classical 
higher-order logic, these too stop short of generating the repertoire of concepts needed for the 
recovery of Frege's Theorem and the axioms for a complete ordered field.34 
                                                
32 The set-theoretic interpretation of higher-order logic is of course entrenched. The foregoing kind of 
reservation about it and alternative approach is represented in work of Hale —see his (2013) and 
forthcoming, and ch. 8 of Hale (2103a), —and the present author (2007), drawing on Rayo and Yablo 
(2001) 
33 Russell's paradox as sketched above relies on ∑1-1 comprehension, but may equally well be 
accomplished using the variant characterisation of membership given at n. 28 above and ∏1-1 
comprehension. ∏1-1 comprehension is needed for the deduction of the Peano Postulates from Hume's 
principle in second-order logic (specifically, for the proof of the Induction Axiom — see Heck (2011) at p. 
289ff—and, if Frege's own definitions of the arithmetical primitives are used, for the proof that every 
number has a successor; see Linnebo (2004) —but no additional comprehension is needed. I believe, but 
have not at the time of writing confirmed, that nothing above ∏1-1 comprehension is needed for existing 
abstractionist recoveries of Real Analysis either in the style of Hale [2000] or the more Dedekindian 
approach of Shapiro [2000].  
34 Wehmeier [1999] shows that Law V plus classical higher-order logic with Δ1-1 comprehension gives a 
consistent system, (where Qx is Δ1-1 comprehensible just in case equivalent both to some ∑1-1 
comprehensible predicate and to some ∏1-1 comprehensible predicate.) The system he considers treats the 
extension-forming operator as a functor attaching only to variables. A consistency result for a somewhat 
stronger system, in which the extension operator is applied also to formulas, is obtained in Ferreira and 
Wehmeier (2002). Paradox is avoided in these systems because self-membership is not Δ1-1 
comprehensible—recall that, as there remarked, the ∑1-1 and ∏1-1 formulations of membership bruited in 
 30 
 As remarked earlier, Dummett's writings on this topic are shot through with the idea that 
the contradictions are the symptom of a deeper philosophical mistake, that Russell's paradox is, as 
it were, a carbuncle on the face of an edifice that betrays a deeper underlying malaise. For 
Dummett, the indefinite extensibility of fundamental mathematical domains is a philosophically 
vital fact about them, and one gets the impression almost that he regarded the paradox as a fitting 
nemesis for Frege's failure to understand and acknowledge this fact. (Though he nowhere says 
what Frege should have done differently if he had recognised the fact, nor how it would have 
helped.) The upshot of our discussion emerges as that this diagnosis is premature. First, it is, in 
any case, reflexive indefinite extensibility that is paradox-spawning, not indefinite extensibility as 
such. But second—the principal point—the objects that Law V introduces compose the instances 
of a reflexively indefinitely extensible concept only when the underlying logic avails itself of 
impredicative forms of comprehension whose consistency with its status as logic proper is an 
unsettled philosophical issue. In our present state of understanding, then, we should not say that 
Frege's most fundamental error was to overlook the indefinite extensibility of value-range as 
characterised by Law V, but merely that he failed to recognise that his conception of the nature of 
the objects of arithmetic and analysis, encoded in Law V, would not cohere with the unrestricted 
use of the higher-order definitional and proof theoretic resources that he needed to obtain the 
fundamental laws of arithmetic and analysis from it.  
8. Coda 
It is wholly understandable that, in his historical context, Frege failed to perceive, let alone 
address the questions concerning the epistemological status of his logic, and its legitimate 
expressive resources, which the contribution made by impredicative comprehension in the 
generation of paradox brings to the centre of the stage. Modern neo-Fregeans have perhaps less 
                                                                                                                                            
n. 28 above are not equivalent. It turns out, however, that these systems, even if their comprehension 
principles could be philosophically motivated, are too weak even for the recovery of primitive recursive 
arithmetic. For details see Cruz-Felipe and Ferreira (2015). 
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excuse. It is, of course, of considerable interest, both technically and philosophically, that 
weakening the powers of objectual comprehension encoded in Law V by replacing it with 
selected, theory-specific abstraction principles while retaining impredicative higher order proof-
theoretic resources can provide deductively adequate foundations for arithmetic and analysis. But 
the philosophical significance of these results continues to depend upon the epistemological 
standing of the underling impredicative higher-order logic; and of all the philosophical issues 
arising in the intensive debates about neo-Fregeanism over the last 30 years, this one surely 
scores maximum points for the simultaneous combination of urgency and neglect.35 The question, 
for any properly logicist interpretation of higher-order logic, is which (if any) kinds of 
impredicative comprehension keep us within the bounds set by the vague notion of intelligible 
predication and to what (if any) extent can the exploitation of the impredicative resources 
technically required for logicist foundations respect those bounds? 
 It has become customary to look at the issues here through the lense of the purely 
syntactic classifications delivered by the Π- and Σ- analytical hierarchies, with escalation of the 
indices somehow taken as representing decreasing (epistemic? metaphysical?) modesty or 
increasing risk. Maybe there is something to that instinct. But the natural starting point for any 
investigation, it seems to me, has to be not syntax but meaning. We need to consider how 
quantified sentences get content in the first place, and here there is a very natural if inchoate 
thought: that the truth-conditions of quantified sentences (of any order) must somehow be 
grounded in the distribution of truth-values across the entire range of their admissible instances, 
and hence that open-sentences formed from quantified sentences by leaving free variables in 
places where expressions for their instances may stand, can have determinate satisfaction-
conditions only to the extent that this basing constraint is respected.  
                                                
35 One important exception to the trend is Øystein Linnebo (2009). See also Linnebo (2010). 
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 This thought, that the truth-conditions of intelligible quantified statements of any order 
require to be grounded in those of statements of the immediately preceding order, obviously 
needs refinement. What, for instance, is the relevant relation of grounding, or basing? And what 
about cases where the range of the quantifier outruns any conceivable expressive resources? Still, 
it contains, I believe, the kernel of the most basic misgiving about higher-order impredicativity. 
The question is therefore whether, properly developed and understood, the need for grounding 
does not actually require predicativism but can be respected by certain kinds of impredicative 
case.36 Syntactically viewed, as noted, the levels of impredicative comprehension needed for the 
development of arithmetic and analysis are no more modest than those required for the derivation 
of Russell's paradox. Might there nevertheless be a philosophically significant line to draw 
between them that we have so far missed? It is not merely the assessment of the import of neo-
Fregeanism's technical achievements that awaits an answer. Until we have one, there is no 
knowing for sure that there is not some well-motivated, albeit non-syntactic, constraint on 
impredicative comprehension that stabilises the project of Grundgesetze.37 
 






                                                
36 Something very similar to this is one upshot of the proposals developed by Øystein Linnebo in the papers 
cited in n. 35. Linnebo outlines a general theory of grounding by stages, embracing both concepts and 
abstract objects, that aims to underwrite a restriction on classical comprehension axioms sufficient to pre-
empt paradox (and indeed solve the Bad Company problem for abstractionism more generally) but which is 
potentially more generous than a requirement of simple (or ramified) predicativity. His proposals, however 
are motivated by metaphysical considerations rather than the kind of semantic considerations gestured at in 
the text, and are neutral between objectual and 'conceptual' (anti-Quinean) understandings of higher-order 
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